Harald Michel
Demographic development and effects on spatial development - using the example of Brandenburg and the Uckermark

Demographic Development and Impacts on Spatial Development - using the example of Brandenburg and the Uckermark

Abstract
The main effects of demographic change - shrinkage and aging on the one hand and increasing concentration on the other - are extremely differentiated in spatial terms. The resulting set of problems is huge and, at the same time, complex. Regional planning models and plans should pay more attention to the demographic trends. The coexistence of growth, restructuring and shrinking processes requires flexible solutions adapted to the specific region. The article illustrates the challenges using the Uckermark district as an example.
Keywords
Demographic change - Aging - Shrinkage - Depopulation - Regional differentiation - Spatial development

1    Demographic initial situation¹

Demographic developments indicate that in 40 years there will be significantly fewer people living in Germany than today. With weaker immigration, the population will fall from 83.2 million to 74.4 million, i.e. by more than 10 percent. Even with moderate influxes, as has been the average in recent decades, it still falls to 78.2 million (14th coordinated population forecast; Federal Statistical Office 2019).

The fact that the population in Germany is shrinking is not essentially the problem. Much more explosive is the change in the age structure, which will have fundamental effects on society and coexistence. At the same time, the demographic differences within Germany will continue to increase due to migration processes and their own dynamics. The new federal states in particular are increasingly among the regions of Germany that are being shaped by this self-reinforcing development.

1.1   Effects of demographic change on the regions of Eastern Germany

The main effects of demographic change - shrinkage and aging with simultaneous increasing concentration and internationalization (combined with an increasing importance of integration problems, especially in the large agglomerations of western Germany) on the other hand - are extremely spatially differentiated and run in the countries and regions, cities and municipalities in Germany are not proportional or linear and not along political or administrative boundaries. We are experiencing a coexistence of growth and shrinkage processes. In a rough overview, there is a demographically-related division of Germany in relation to this development: In addition to prosperous metropolitan areas that are increasingly attractive, large parts of northern and eastern Germany, especially in the rural peripheries, are experiencing change as a shrinkage as more and more people emerge and more emptying spaces leading to depopulation with a rapid increase in the proportion of the elderly population.

The number of inhabitants in the rural peripheral regions will shrink more in the next 20 years than in the past 22 years and the process of shifting the age structure (aging) will accelerate, which will lead to a further widening of the demographic differences. Of course, this does not remain without impact on the settlement structures and their development, especially in East Germany. The rural areas, which make up around four fifths of the eastern German federal states, are subject to permanent and far-reaching demographic change processes, which in particular call into question the guarantee of public services in more and more areas. This process is further reinforced by internal migration in East Germany itself, as a few urban centers are able to stabilize themselves through immigration from rural areas, albeit only temporarily. On the one hand, these processes promote the accelerated „degradation̴ of further areas of land. Demographic concepts and initiatives in the competition for residents (EW), whose long-term benefits for municipalities are unclear, should therefore be reflected.

The greatest challenges in dealing with demographic change in East Germany, with the core issue of ensuring public services for a large proportion of the residents of these parts of the country, are still ahead and will cause increasing problems.
These demographic conditions in East Germany have so far been mainly attributed to a particularly pronounced aging and shrinking process. Nevertheless, these regions have shown a clearly asymmetrical development of emigration for years - also from a gender perspective - which, particularly in the rural areas of the districts, has led to a pronounced male predominance in the younger age groups of the working population. In combination with the already known economic and social problems, this gender-specific demographic imbalance is already posing major challenges for the region today, but especially in the medium and long term.

The situation is differentiated: While the gender proportions of the cities in East and West Germany are roughly at a comparable level and there is even a surplus of women in university towns, the rural regions in East and West Germany differ more significantly in terms of the deficit of women than ever. Especially in younger age groups, there is a disproportionate female migration from rural regions, while this gender selectivity is exactly the opposite for older women in most regions. Districts in the north of East Germany, but also in Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt, are particularly affected by this numerically large imbalance between men and women of younger and, in some cases, middle age groups in a region. In some districts the male surplus among 18 to 25 year olds is 20 percent.

The resulting problem is enormous and at the same time diverse. The demographic, economic and social effects of this development go beyond the immediate effects of the emigration of large parts of a respective „mother generation“. They cannot currently be fully assessed in the medium and long term, for example: care for older relatives (even based on conservative calculations, the number of potential care people in families in East Germany will decrease by at least 25 percent by 2035 and this will be the case), absolute and relative increasing number of those in need of care or regional dominance or tolerance towards deviant behavior with a male connotation, which can have a lasting damaging effect on the region's image from the outside perspective. In a situation in which not only has the number of young people leaving school been continuously declining since the mid-1990s, but is forecast to continue to decline dramatically, this results in an extraordinarily difficult demographic situation (Michel 2017).

1.2   Causes of development

As a result of the emigration of particularly young people (a significant number of over 1.8 million people from 1991 to 2012) and the drop in birth rates since 1989/90, the new federal states are experiencing a serious aging process as a whole. In 1990, the new federal states with an old-age dependency ratio of less than 20 (or just over 20) were among the countries with relatively few older people in relation to the working-age population. In 2030, old-age dependency ratios will be over 70. Saxony-Anhalt will then probably have a ratio of 71, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania of 70 and Thuringia of almost 70.

1.3   Persistence of processes

There can be no talk of a trend reversal at present or in the foreseeable future. Without exception, all demographic processes in East Germany are running on the paths that have been shown for around 20 years: the aging and shrinking process continues unabated and will even increase in intensity compared to the West German countries. Since 2010, the generations born after the fall of communism in East Germany have moved into active migratory age. For well-known reasons (drop in births), these age cohorts are up to 50 percent smaller in number than the previous cohorts. In many East German countries there is simply hardly anyone in the relevant age groups who could emigrate now or in the near future.

1.4   The accelerated emptying of the peripheral spaces

The focus of the analysis is on rural areas as peripheral areas. In East Germany they make up around 80 percent of the area and are home to around 50 percent of the population (for comparison: in the West German states around 20 percent of the population lives in rural areas, which make up around 50 percent of the area). It is precisely in these areas that demographic change - shrinking population numbers, aging residents - will be concentrated in the next few years and will take place at increasing speed in all areas.


Fig. 1: Regions in demographic change / source: BBSR 2014: 17

It can be assumed that these disparities will lead to permanent regional differences, to an intensification of the development differences between urban centers and rural-peripheral areas: a direct coexistence of strongly or slightly shrinking, stagnating and temporarily stable to slightly growing regions will emerge.

In addition, there are unfavorable geographical conditions. In East Germany there are significantly fewer large cities and metropolitan regions (with the exception of Berlin) that can serve as regional stability and development anchors.

The cities and communities in the rural regions described are particularly affected by the consequences of demographic change; they face a wide variety of political and social problem constellations. Migration processes create demographic and social disproportions in the age and gender structure. The decline in population leads to the general infrastructure falling below the carrying capacity; This means that the maintenance of functioning regional labor and supply markets is at stake. The sharp increase in the proportion of old people places high demands on local infrastructure to ensure public services.

1.5   Temporary stabilization of middle and upper centers through immigration from the rural surrounding areas

The process of „desolation“ of peripheral areas as a result of demographic change is further intensified by internal migration, as a few urban centers are able to stabilize themselves through influx from rural areas, albeit only temporarily (islands of stability). In this context, the goal of creating equal living conditions in all parts of the country as a state goal, which is currently being discussed again in current politics, is not realistic in this form and must therefore be fundamentally redefined (cf. BMI 2019).

Equality can and must no longer be understood primarily in terms of regional features, but rather must be defined as the creation of social equality of opportunity. In view of the different developments in the sub-regions, there can no longer be uniform standards. Minimum standards must be redefined, particularly in shrinking rural areas, and spatially graduated and realistic offerings of social services and benefits must be developed. However, access to high-quality education and health facilities must be ensured in all parts of the country. The current growth-oriented understanding of politics needs to be supplemented by a paradigm of shrinkage and restructuring.

The control instruments that are primarily aimed at distributing growth are no longer sufficient to meet the challenges of demographic shrinkage processes. Rather, processes of dismantling, stabilization, revitalization and qualitative development must be designed. Mission statements and plans should monitor demographic developments more closely and have a controlling effect.

The coexistence of growth, restructuring and shrinkage processes requires flexible solutions tailored to the respective region. As a result, corresponding models have to be edited or reformulated at regional and municipal level in order to align them with the requirements of demographic change as integrated regional adaptation and development strategies.

2    Situation in the state of Brandenburg

The state of Brandenburg occupies a special position in this development in that its peripheral regions of the „wide metropolitan area“ (with over 60 percent of the state's inhabitants) are developing identically to the other states in East Germany, while the area around Berlin („Berlin Surrounding area“) is the only region in the New States to benefit to a remarkable extent from the charisma of a so-called „anchor city“, the capital Berlin.


Fig. 2: Population development in the state of Brandenburg compared to 1990 / Source: own evaluations of the IFAD database https://ifad-berlin.homepage.t-online.de/index.html (26.07.2023)

Based on the balance of natural population movements alone, the state of Brandenburg has had a population decline of 10 to 15 thousand inhabitants (PE) every year since 1993. Until the year 2000, this was counteracted by the spatial population movement with a positive net migration of around 10 to 30 thousand people per year. Overall, the population of the state of Brandenburg grew. It was only in 2000 that the positive balance of migration and the negative balance of natural movement (excess deaths) were balanced out and thus a standstill in population development. Since 2001, the spatial balance has been low and the overall development is determined by the negative natural balance - with the consequence of the significant decline in the number of inhabitants since 2000, interrupted from 2015 by slight increases from immigration.

The forecasts for Brandenburg up to 2030 (LBV 2018) assume that the population will decrease by around 60,000 people to 2,495 million people by 2030, and in the longer term even to 2,222 million people by 2060.


Fig. 3: Population projection 2030 compared to 2010 for the middle areas / Source: LBV 2018, Attachment 2, Paper 3

A massive shrinkage is to be expected in the rural areas („“wide metropolitan region“) (from 2016 to 2030 by around 127,300 inhabitants - that corresponds to -8.3%), while in the Berlin area there is an increase of 83,800 inhabitants in the medium term (that is +8.7%) can be assumed. However, the potential for population growth from the capital will only be able to compensate for the fundamental developments for a limited time.

This means that the socio-demographic differences between the Berlin area and the wider metropolitan area will continue to increase in the future.

3    Case study: The Uckermark district

The Uckermark district is an example of the development in the „wide metropolitan area“ of the state of Brandenburg defined according to the state development plan for the capital region (LEP HR 2019). With around 120,000 inhabitants, it has the highest population of the districts that do not border Berlin and at the same time (together with the Prignitz district) has the lowest population density of all districts in Brandenburg with 39 inhabitants per km² (the „wide metropolitan area“ has a population density of 57 inhabitants per km²).

The sharp decline in population, resulting from a negative natural population balance (excess death) and high emigration figures, has been observed for many years. As a result, the Uckermark district can be viewed as a prime example of the complex demographic aging process in rural regions.

There has been a population decline of around 28 percent since 1990. This is an exceptional value which, however, can be found in one way or another in most of the rural peripheral areas of the New States.

When looking at the population development and forecast (LBV 2018), it becomes clear that the trend of population shrinkage will continue. By 2030, the population of the Uckermark region will decline by a further 17 percent. The slight increase in 2015/16 as a result of increased immigration was only a temporary interruption to the trend that continued from 2017 and also shows that international immigration, even of a considerable size (in 2015/16 Germany had a net immigration of 1.639 million people) have little impact on the course of demographic change processes at the regional level in East Germany.



The development of the age structure of the population in the Uckermark district exemplifies the changes in an aging society. The younger generation is becoming increasingly smaller and the number of old cohorts is constantly increasing. The changed age structure in the Uckermark district can be illustrated using the old age and youth quotients.



In 1993, the ratio of young people under the age of 15 was still a remarkable 41.7 people per 100 people of working age between 15 and 65 years. 25 years later there were only 28.8 young people for every 100 employable people. The old-age dependency ratio has developed in the opposite direction. In 1993 there were only 18.3 people over 65 for every 100 employable people. In 2018 there were already 48.8 old residents per 100 people aged 15 to 65. The forecasts show that the respective trends for the old age and youth quotient will become even stronger in the future.

The Uckermark district is therefore an example of the rural peripheral regions of eastern Germany most affected by demographic change. Their further demographic development will only be marginally influenced by political intervention; what is required is an intelligent design of regionally tailored adaptation strategies.

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¹  The data and figures mentioned in the text are based on our own evaluations of the IFAD database:
   https://ifad-berlin.homepage.t-online.de/index.html (26.07.2023)
²  https://ifad-berlin.homepage.t-online.de/index.html (06.07.2023)

---

Literature

BBSR - Federal Institute for Building, Urban and Spatial Research in the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (2014): Regions particularly affected by demographic change. An important topic in the context of demographic strategy. Bonn. = BBSR online publication 11/2014.
BMI - Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (2019): Our plan for Germany - equal living conditions everywhere. Berlin.
LBV - State Office for Building and Transport Brandenburg (2018): Population forecast for the state of Brandenburg 2017 to 2030. Potsdam.
LEP HR - State Development Plan for the Berlin-Brandenburg Capital Region (2019): Ordinance on the State Development Plan for the Berlin-Brandenburg Capital Region (LEP HR) dated April 29, 2019, which came into force on July 1, 2019.
Federal Office of Statistics (2019): 14. Coordinated population projections. Wiesbaden.
Michel, H. (2017): Something new in the East? In: Mayer, T. (Ed.): The transformative power of demography. Wiesbaden, 331-339.

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Jump to publications 2024

 (back to the start)

Lukas Steinwandter

Politics, Defense, Culture, Coexistence
It's the demography, stupid

20.07.2024 — 07:38

Never before in Europe's history have birth rates collapsed as much as they have today, while life expectancy has increased. Almost all of the problems we will face in the coming decades are related to this. Corrigenda sheds light on the dark spots in the demographic debate.

Demographic change / ©IMAGO / Rupert Oberhäuser / Corrigenda-assembly

Whether we like it or not, we are all protagonists and witnesses of an unprecedented development: Europe's population is shrinking rapidly, while life expectancy is increasing. This demographic change is not an ordinary structural change, stresses sociologist Harald Michel, but a „megatrend“ that will keep us busy for at least another century. The Humboldt University lecturer at Berlin emphasized to Corrigenda: „It affects all areas of life and will change the societies affected to an extent never seen before.“
And he warns: „There are therefore no ready-made and tried-and-tested recipes for how European societies should respond appropriately to this development. The changes associated with demographic change pose completely new and very complex challenges for the European population.“

Table of Contents

 1) Population trends are so powerful
 2) Ageing and the four dimensions of demographic change
 3) The ethnic composition is changing
 4) The spatial distribution
 5) The consequences
 6) Politics
 7) Religion
 8) Social coexistence
 9) Culture
10) Innovation and Defense
11) Conclusion

Sounds exaggerated? Yes, but what has been said is true, perhaps even understated, if you delve into the astonishing world of demography. Unlike corona models, demographers don't just estimate, they predict. The reason the predictions are so accurate is that based on today's combined birth rates, you can calculate quite precisely how many children the children born today will father or give birth to later.

1) Population trends are so powerful   (back to table of contents)

And this population development is not linear, but exponential. This is due to the changing cohorts of women. The following graphic shows an example of the force with which demographic declines can manifest themselves:


Demographic change: This is how quickly a population shrinks with a birth rate of 1,4 / © Corrigenda

The picture shows a population of 1,000 men and 1,000 women with a birth rate of 1.4 children per woman. In the second generation, there are only 700 women, then 490, then 343 — and after around 200 years, this population is decimated to fewer than 100 women. Of course, birth rates change over time and do not remain exactly constant as in the example, but this example clearly shows the force with which they impact on a population.
Of course, this also applies the other way round, with a high number of children. The graphic below shows a population of 100 men and 100 women with a birth rate of 3 children per woman. After four generations, i.e. after around 120 years, the population has increased fivefold, and after 200 years it has increased more than tenfold. But we are still a long way from having such a high number of children: as the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden reported just this week, the number of children per German woman fell to 1,26 in 2023.



This is how fast a population with a birth rate of 3 grows / © Corrigenda

2) Ageing and the four dimensions of demographic change   (back to table of contents)

According to sociologist Harald Michel, demographic change can be divided into four areas: the quantitative change in the population size, the change in the age structure or the shift in proportions, the change in the socio-cultural structure and the change in the spatial distribution of the population.
Since 1972, more people have died in Germany than are born. While the average age in 1990 was 38.3 years, this figure rose to a median age of 45 years by 2022. After Japan, Germany has the oldest population of all major industrialized countries. The median age indicates the midpoint at which half are younger and half are older. The population of Germany is almost twice as old as the world average.
But the average age is one thing, the proportions are another. An important demographic indicator is the old-age dependency ratio. It indicates how many people aged 65 and over are there for every 100 people in the group between 20 and 64 years. In Germany, the old-age dependency ratio was 37 in 2023, which means that for every 100 20- to 64-year-olds, there were 37 over-65s. According to the Federal Statistical Office, this figure will shift dramatically by 2070: for every 100 20- to 64-year-olds, there will be 55 over-65s.


© Federal Office of Statistics

When Konrad Adenauer left the Chancellery in 1963, twelve percent of people in Germany were over 65 years old. When Helmut Kohl was voted out of office in 1998, the figure was 16 percent. When Angela Merkel stopped being head of government in 2021, the figure was 22 percent. The development shows the dynamics of aging: initially, the proportion of elderly people increases only slowly, but eventually ever faster. This is already noticeable in rural areas: gray-haired people dominate the village scene, and women with strollers are a rarity.
Eastern European countries will be hit even harder than Germany. In Lithuania and Poland, the old-age dependency ratio will be 73 and 64 respectively by 2070.
The „under-youthization“ (Ursula Lehr) of the population, i.e. the lack of children, in addition to the gender and relationship crisis, is leading to changes in the way we live together. As the Federal Statistical Office recently announced, one in five people in Germany lived alone in 2023. The proportion was above the EU average of 16 percent.

3) The ethnic composition is changing   (back to table of contents)

The socio-cultural changes are particularly drastic, especially in Germany. Their consequences can only be guessed at. However, the numbers speak for themselves. Thilo Sarrazin summed it up perfectly. According to his calculations, by 2070 only one in five people born in Germany will have an ethnic German background.
When asked for a corrigenda, the economist revealed the parameters that led him to this conclusion:

„According to the 2023 microcensus, the proportion of people with a migration background among those under 15 was already 41.5 percent in 2022. Since the birth rate is significantly higher among women with a migration background, I estimate that around 50 percent of births in Germany are currently to women with a migration background.“

What to do

We can compensate for the population decline for a while by increasing productivity, increasing the female employment rate and the retirement age. However, these measures will largely be exhausted in the foreseeable future. Economist Thomas Straubhaar sees artificial intelligence and increasing robotization as another possible solution, but overlooks the fact that machines do not pay taxes and cannot maintain social structures. Or would you like your children to be taught by computers and cared for by robots when you are old?
The only options left are to increase immigration or to increase the birth rate. Several countries have already proven that the latter is possible. France and the Scandinavian countries have been achieving consistently high birth rates for decades through good childcare and targeted tax incentives that primarily encourage the birth of second and third children.
Our problems are obviously linked to the structure of our society and cannot be solved permanently by immigration, as this only fills gaps without addressing the causes of the deficit. Therefore, we must change the structures that are responsible for the low birth rate. Even if this will not be easy, we must at least try, because ultimately it is our future that is at stake.

It is important to remember that according to the official definition, a person who was born abroad or who has a parent who was not born in Germany has a migration background. However, if the grandparents were born in Germany, their grandchildren no longer have a migration background for official statistics.
The former SPD politician and former Berlin Finance Senator sums up:

„The decline in the proportion of ethnic Germans among births continues dynamically from year to year because

•	Germans have around a third fewer children each year than would be necessary to maintain the population,
•	the birth rate of women with a migration background is significantly higher,
•	the persistently high level of immigration of 400,000 to 500,000 annually is primarily made up of young and younger people who are soon starting families in Germany or bringing their children to Germany as part of family reunification.

In this respect, I think it is likely that in 2070 the proportion of ethnic Germans among births will be below rather than above 20 percent.“

Proportion of people with a migration background in Germany by district / © demografie-europa.eu

4) The spatial distribution   (back to table of contents)

The Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) recently presented a new study on the spatial distribution of the population. According to the study, the population will grow by 800,000 people by 2045 due to high levels of immigration. However, the development will be characterized by a strong exodus from rural areas.
„While economically strong cities and their surrounding areas as well as numerous rural regions, particularly in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, continue to grow, the population in structurally weak areas away from the metropolises continues to decline,“ write the experts from the BBSR. „According to forecasts, the districts of Erzgebirgskreis (Saxony), Greiz (Thuringia) and Mansfeld-Südharz (Saxony-Anhalt) will lose more than a fifth of their population by 2045.“
The researchers also evaluated the future age structure in the various regions. „In regions with a sharp decline in population numbers, however, the average age will rise more than average.“ In 2045, people in the districts of Vorpommern-Rügen (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), Mansfeld-Südharz (Saxony-Anhalt), Altenburger Land (Thuringia), Greiz (Thuringia) and Spree-Neiße (Brandenburg) will be on average older than 50 years.

5) The consequences   (back to table of contents)

But what consequences do all these developments have for society? While economists and demographers — there were still professorships for this at the time, but not a single one today — warned of this demographic change in the 1990s (and were ignored), a rethinking has at least begun in the last few years when it comes to economics. Who pays the pensions? Where are the skilled workers? Who finances the welfare state? These questions are now at least being discussed.
We therefore want to concentrate on what has not yet been considered elsewhere or has only been considered marginally: How is the individual changing, how is coexistence changing in a rapidly shrinking society?

6) Politics    (back to table of contents)

A pensioner usually has different expectations of politics than a 16-year-old. In a democracy, the people decide on their representatives, and because every vote is worth the same, the composition of the demo has (party) political effects. This was clearly visible in the EU parliamentary elections this summer. Of the 60.9 million German voters, 8.8 million were between 16 and 29 years old, which corresponds to 14.5 percent. The group of over-65s, however, made up more than twice as many at 18.1 million (29.7 percent). Older people voted for the CDU/CSU and SPD at a far higher rate than average. The AfD and smaller left-wing parties received a below-average number of votes from them.
The ethnic composition is also causing political upheaval. The Democratic Alliance for Diversity and Awakening (DAVA) party, which is close to Erdoğan and wants to promote a „more positive image of Islam“, was the strongest force in several Duisburg constituencies. It also achieved respectable results in Gelsenkirchen. Voter turnout in these districts was low, but due to the dynamic population developments shown above, exceptions can quickly become the norm.
In the local elections in England, several Muslim candidates won, even though they did not belong to any of the major parties. After the parliamentary elections a few weeks later, a video of the victorious Labour candidate Adnan Hussain went viral. He appeared euphoric in a hall full of Muslims: „We will raise our voices for Gaza!
We will keep fighting, until death, Inshallah!“
Of course, new ethnic groups will also take their place and the privileges they have fought for democratically, sometimes even with violence. Street names, shops, religious sites, and even entire streetscapes will change even more than we are already experiencing today.

7) Religion   (back to table of contents)

Religion has an influence on population development that should not be underestimated. At the end of 2023, the Federal Institute for Population Research published a study that further underlined this statement. The desire to have children is already formed in childhood and adolescence. Religious people already have higher fertility intentions in adolescence. The religiously influenced 15-year-olds surveyed wanted to have an average of 2.1 children. Among their peers without religious ties, the value was significantly lower at 1.7 and also below the replacement level.
Now two trends are coming together that are intensifying the ethnic shift in Germany: while the indigenous population is becoming less and less religious, new population groups are joining, primarily from Islamic countries, who are significantly more religious. However, it is unclear how many Muslims there are currently in Germany because the Federal Statistical Office does not record the Islamic religion when compiling the microcensus.
However, the current census for 2022 showed a drastic decline in the Christian population. While Catholics made up the majority in 23 major cities in 2011, in 2022 this was only the case in four major cities: Bottrop, Münster, Paderborn and Trier. A silent shift is also taking place in religious terms in Germany and Europe.

8) Social coexistence   (back to table of contents)

In May, researchers at the University Hospital in Bonn presented a sensational study. Journalists asked whether loneliness can be combatted with a nasal spray. „Depression, heart disease or dementia — people who are permanently lonely have a higher risk of becoming ill,“ said the research team, which, in collaboration with scientists from Israel, administered the hormone oxytocin to 78 people who felt lonely via nasal spray — and achieved success.
Oxytocin, as journalist Stefan Schulz pointed out in his 2022 book „Die Altenrepublik“, is an underestimated antagonist of stress hormones. „We hardly know it, but we are addicted to it: Oxytocin. The concentration of this hormone in our blood always rises when we feel comfortable and safe, accepted and understood. Unexpected but pleasant skin contact sometimes turns oxytocin into a real intoxicant.“ But Oxytocin is much more than a „cuddle hormone“, it acts as a neurotransmitter, reduces anxiety and ensures more trust.
However, loneliness and isolation are increasing. More and more young people feel lonely. To put it bluntly, if there are fewer people who live in isolation, they will become mentally and physically ill and unhappier. Schulz quotes psychologist Jean M. Twenge: Young adults today are involved in fewer traffic accidents, fights, etc. because they are generally less involved. „They feel most comfortable in their bedrooms.“
This condition is closely linked to the use of smartphones. Since smartphones have been around, young people have been unhappier. Those who spend more time in front of the screen are less satisfied and have less real social contact.


An unhappy teenager in her bedroom: being alone makes you sick / © IMAGO / Panthermedia

It is not only young people who are affected by loneliness. In the typical tourist towns, you can now book people to pose for photos with you or to walk through the city. In the Alps, ski instructors are booked, not to learn to ski, but so that a lonely tourist can enjoy some time together.
One reason is that women are now older than 30 when they give birth to their first child, which is why there are fewer extended families in rural areas than there were 80 or 100 years ago. This not only affects the demographic composition, but also the individual child.
An only child whose parents are already over 30 years old when he is born and have achieved a certain level of material prosperity is looked after differently than young families with four or five children. The only child usually gets more expensive clothes, smartphones, computers, and more of his wishes are fulfilled. How does a child who grows up like this deal with drastic changes later on, for example when he has to look after himself for the first time?
Studies also show that siblings are more socially compatible and, for example, get along better with other children in kindergarten than only children. There is also evidence that siblings are less likely to get divorced later in life. They are also mentally healthier later in life.
A new study from this year found that people with a small „reservoir of relatives“ are more likely than average to suffer from physical limitations and health problems. In contrast, people in a family structure with three generations are less likely to suffer from depression and physical limitations. The resilience of the remaining young people decreases.

9) Culture   (back to table of contents)

Without young people, there can be no youth movement. There have been no youth movements in Europe since at least 1990. On closer inspection, the so-called climate youth is not one, because the impulses did not come from young people, but from adults. Just think of the film „An Inconvenient Truth“ by former US Vice President Al Gore and director Davis Guggenheim, as well as the influence of Greta Thunberg's parents on the commitment of their mentally impaired daughter.
Sociologists explained the lack of youth movements decades ago as a result of the rapprochement between the generations. Adults were no longer perceived as authoritarian against whom one had to rebel. In 2017, sociologist Andreas Reckwitz spoke of a „juvenilization“, which means:

„Youthfulness as a cultural pattern is becoming attractive and dominant for all age groups. The singularistic lifestyle of the new middle class contains an inner affinity to youthfulness. A cultural pattern of (moderate) youthfulness shapes their activist lifestyle, which claims self-realization and 'openness', strives for new experiences in leisure time and at work, is urban and is characterized by a considerable need for physical activity.“

But there is a much more likely explanation for the (politically) culturally weaker youth: there are not enough members. 150 years ago, young people formed the overwhelming majority of society. Since then, this society has become older. The sociologist and economist Gunnar Heinsohn found a close correlation between the third and fourth sons of a society and political, religious and even military changes. This does not necessarily have to be the case, as the examples of China and Brazil show, but a sufficiently large number of young people, especially males, can be considered a prerequisite for such changes.

10) Innovation and Defense   (back to table of contents)

Age also plays a role in innovation. Research shows that men and women are innovative during a certain time window around the age of 35 to 40. Most developments in companies come from employees of this age. Innovation decreases among younger and older people, which is why corresponding statistics often look like an inverted „U“. But if there are no longer enough younger employees to follow, innovation is slowed down. Older people also tend to learn new technologies less often, which slows down developments when this age group makes up a large part of society.
Demographic change has an impact on national defense. It has already forced several Western European countries to move away from conscription armies and towards professional armed forces, which would no longer be able to repel an aggressor, but are designed for missions on the European periphery and for work in NATO.
While the People's Republic of China is aware of the demographic consequences for the existence of the nation and civilization, this realization is only just maturing in the West. At least the United States of America has recognized the problem. Author Schulz summed this up: „Family policy in America is now part of national defense.“ He referred, among other things, to the „American Families Plan“ by President Joe Biden (Democratic Party), which was blocked by a party colleague and would have provided investments and tax credits for families and children within ten years.

11) Conclusion   (back to table of contents)

Demographic developments have consequences for all situations in life without exception. Almost all of the problems that our society will be confronted with in the coming years and decades are caused by the ageing — and in Germany's case, shrinking — population. While other countries see demography as a national challenge, population research is a marginal issue in Germany, probably because research into peoples and their populations is frowned upon due to the Nazi past, even if it is done in a scientifically neutral manner.
One aspect is never discussed, even with the increasingly important economic implications of demographic change: abortion and its consequences. According to official figures, 6.2 million unborn children have been aborted in Germany since abortion was legally legalized in 1976. If you add the offspring of these unborn children to the birth rate of 1.4, there are now more than ten million people missing in Germany.
Many a discussion, many a problem — the key word being the shortage of skilled workers — would be obsolete today if these aborted people were alive. But now demographic change and its consequences for society as a whole must be discussed. And solutions must be found that go beyond immigration. After all, humanity as a whole will shrink by the end of the century. And action must be taken soon, because demographic changes take decades to take effect.

(© Corrigenda)
 (back to the beginning of the article)

Sociologist Harald Michel: „We are not hostile to children, but we are weaning children“
© Institute for Applied Demography (I/F/A/D) / CANVA / IMAGO / Funke Foto Services / Corrigenda-Montage

More people have been dying in Germany for more than 50 years. Since the early 1970s, the birth rate has been below the reproductive level of 2.1, i.e. the average number of children per woman, so that the population is preserved. There are not many experts in Germany who are familiar with the field of demography and also earn this title. The demographic change was ignored and neglected for too long.

One of them is sitting in a café in the Berlin district of Friedrichshagen on a late summer afternoon. Harald Michel has held a demographic lecture at the Berlin Humboldt-University for more than 30 years. It is the oldest in Germany, there is no own chair. The council of the native of Saxony and doctorate in sociologists was in demand in various expert bodies, also of governments. But Michel doesn't think much of the performance of politics in dealing with the demographic decline - as well as her possibilities.

In an interview with Corrigenda, Michel explains what the demographic change is really all about, why former governments probably knew how to learn what Germany can learn from the mistakes of other countries.

Dr. Michel, you have been following lectures on demography for over 30 years, now it is the only ones in all of Germany. How bad is the situation?

It is as bad as we have foreseen. The development, especially in the case of births, is now obvious. In between there was always hope, but only apparently, because the birth rate grew, but these were normal temporary fluctuations in birth events. The numbers are currently about a third below the reproductive level. We have known this since the 1970s at the latest. Now the consequences are visible. And the development is irreversible until further notice.

Is this demographic crisis threatening to exist for Germany?

The question is often asked: what happens? Do the Germans die out? One can certainly say one: there will be someone here, even in several generations, but it will no longer be this population composition that we have been used to for generations. And you would have to tell the citizens clearly. Our country will change dramatically because we have long since exceeded certain tilting points.

Development of the number of live births and deaths in Germany
© Institut for Applied Demography (I/F/A/D).

Was there a comparable situation in European history? During the Thirty Years' War or during the plague, a third of the population died.

No, there has never been such a situation. What you describe are exogenous processes. People died in large numbers from the great killers of the time - illness, war and hunger. But the populations always had the potential to regenerate again, namely due to the high number of children. At that time they were between five and nine children per woman. We are now observing a completely new phenomenon that has never existed, except at the end of the Roman Empire, perhaps when the patricians' fertility rate was two, but the data storage is too insecure. From recent history, the past thousand years, this has never existed because the interaction between births and deaths has always worked. The births made up for what the mortality of mortality removed, it hardly had to be regulated. Of course there were companies that did not do this, for example in Eastern Europe, they have disappeared.

Which one, for example?

Slavic or Germanic peoples, also from the migration period that no longer exists. The vandals, for example. They didn't make it for various reasons. But it was usually the case that mortality moved notches into the population development, which was made up again by the high birth number.

„People die after twice the lifetime, but suddenly the birth number no longer plays along.“

So the stabilizing element is the high birth number.

Yes, and now it's the other way around. Today we have the exogenous factors under control. Today people die relatively controlled today, after twice the lifetime than on average over the past thousand years. But now suddenly the number of births no longer plays along. The compensation function is canceled.

Does science have an explanation for this?

The books that deal with the decline in birth fill halls. Incidentally, science in this country has been dealing with it since the 1900s. During the time before the First World War, you will find masses about the decline in birth with all possible attempts to explain.

We are not a specialist magazine. What are the most common explanations?

Do you want to hear my favorite thesis?

Yes, please!

It comes from Juan Winkelhagen. That was a scientist who wrote a book after the First World War (1924) about a decline in birth and cycling. He said to have found that the more cycling among women spread, the faster the births went down. In this respect, this is an interesting thesis, not because it gave a direct connection, but because it could be due to emancipation. The coincidence of the increase in female cyclists and the decline in births have the same cause, a beautiful example of the work of background variables in correlation relationships.

„One of the scenarios was: bind women to the 'ckc' - children, kitchen, church.“

One could now accuse you of hostility against women. Should women go back to the stove to say it too pointed?

In 1994, we had a meeting at the 'American Enterprise Institute' in Washington, a conservative US think tank. They had already studied German reunification very carefully in the 1990s. I would even say that there are ten times as many publications on 'Demographics in Germany' in the USA as there are by Germans themselves. In any case, they have closely observed the demographic development and there was a round table to discuss what could be done in the USA if there were also such demographic collapses. One of the scenarios was a kind of conservative revolution: to tie women back to the 'ckc' - children, kitchen, church.

How likely did the round think that was?

They said to themselves: We still have the potential, we still have families with five to six children in the religiously-based Midwest. If you could continue to nurture them, it might work.

One could also put it positively: the state and society should again value marriage, family, and children, and present them as something positive.

I'm very skeptical about how to influence this. I'm different from those who have a purely economic approach to this issue. Financial support, tax breaks, companies that favor mothers - it's not going to work. People often say that we're a society that's hostile to children, but that's not true. We're not hostile to children, but we're weaned. Society is no longer used to children. So what do you do? You have to make a social change in people's minds, you can't do that with money. Karl Otto Hondrich, a more leftist sociologist, once said: „Societies that, from generation to generation, receive more and more parental benefits than they give back and pass on, thus fall into an imbalance that may shake their moral core.“

This statement is actually originally conservative.

So I disagree with the left-wing thesis that it doesn't matter where you're born. There's a generational link. It may not be genetic or metaphysical, but it's definitely social and cultural. You can't ignore it. If we break that link, we're going to cut our culture. Again, the population is not necessarily going to go away, because there's going to be other people living here, but maybe they're going to stop drinking coffee and they're going to look different. Ultimately, it's about defining a culture that you want to see here.

Diagram: Total net migration Germany Abroad
© Institute for Applied Demography (I/F/A/D).

There are socially disadvantaged families with many children who show that financial reasons are not necessarily decisive.

My favorite example of the abundance of children in Germany is Emsland, where municipalities received prizes for child-friendly policies because their municipalities had relatively high birth rates. However, the abundance of children there had nothing to do with the mayor's great population policies. It was a contact point for Russian Germans at the time, and hundreds of Russian Old Believers, who are very conservative, came. Most of their families had six to eight children. The mayors came to these prizes like the Virgin to the Child..

„The economic situation has nothing to do with births.“

When did today's demographic decline begin?

In Germany before the First World War.

But that was an economically prosperous time!

The economic situation has nothing to do with births. We can have high births when the economy is weaker, and we can have high numbers when the economy is good. Economics is not the only explanation. Germany is lagging behind on this issue. Do you know when there have been demography chairs in Germany? Only since 1972/73, when there were over 2,000 scientists in the United States doing this. In Germany, the first chair was set up in Bielefeld, starting in 1981 with Herwig Birg, who then retired, and then in 1972 in East Berlin at Humboldt-University, 2018. Since then, there is no explicit Chair of Demography.

Not so in France. The French have been preoccupied with their demographic decline for some time.

Their biggest impact was defeat in 1871. One popular proposition is that the war against the German Empire was lost because France had too low a birth rate. But France had a different population system. Before 1900, 90 percent of the people were farmers. In France, there was the real division principle, a special form of inheritance. It was fatal for the farmer to have three or more sons, because he had to divide up the farm. So the French farmer was anxious to have fewer children.

What was birth control like back then? There was no pill.

Almost every society can limit its fertility if it is necessary to survive, including pre-industrial, agrarian societies that did not yet have modern preventive mechanisms. The means are manifold, ranging from coitus interruptus and condoms to lactative semenorrhea (extended breastfeeding), to plant-based contraceptives, to abortions and infanticide, such as neglect.

So France has been struggling with demographic decline for some time?

Even then, the French had only two or three children. At the same time, the birth rate began to decline, even earlier than in Germany. From France comes the decadence debate, and French literature is full of it.

Meaning?

The population becomes decadent because it doesn't have children anymore. The demographer Arsène Dumont was one of the first to formulate this perspective of a self-destructive individualistic civilization, the principe toxique, that destroys its own demographic base. That was the basis of the great trauma of the French. After the French Revolution, decadence comes, then 1871, and you lose. It's the greatest humiliation for the French, more significant than World War I and World War II combined. Since then, France has had a population policy, but it's not very successful.

„Von der Leyen bet on child benefit. But child benefit does not produce children.“

One should also learn from other people's mistakes: So what doesn't help?

We had this discussion when Ursula von der Leyen was Federal Minister for Family Affairs. I had several discussions with her, but unfortunately she did the opposite of what we had discussed.

What's that supposed to mean?

Take cash benefits, for example. Von der Leyen bet on child support. But child support doesn't create children. She believed that family policy worked like a box where you put money in the top and children come out at the bottom.

But France still has a consistently higher fertility rate than Germany.

This is due to immigration to the Maghreb. However, you must not address this issue. In France, this is a taboo, where births are not recorded according to ethnic origin. The Maghrebians keep fertility a little higher. However, I maintain - and nobody can disprove me, because the figures are not being collected - that the indigenous French woman has just as few children as the German.

Nevertheless, France is often taken as a role model. It has a better family policy and more money is being spent on it in terms of gross domestic product.

None of this makes any difference. The argument about kindergartens and day care places does not apply at all, and it can also be substantiated, because we have East Germany as a foil. Since reunification, East Germany has had full provision of kindergarten places, and yet, until recently, fertility in East Germany was lower than in West Germany.

We interviewed an economist last year who interviewed East Germans and came to the conclusion, among other things, that the environment plays a big role. Where there are children in the environment, having children is more normal, so having children as a self-reinforcing factor.

Which brings us back to weaning children.

Why did politics not listen and take countermeasures?!

You said earlier that we had known how the demographic situation in Germany was going to develop since the 1980s. Why did politicians not listen to this and take countermeasures then?

At the end of the 1980s, we had a very favourable situation: there were budget surpluses. Germany could have set the course economically at that time. I am not talking about controlling births at all, but about making social security systems fit with capital cover. In other words, what the Federal Government now wants to do with debt and in homeopathic doses. At the time, it was even discussed. The debate was also much more serious and without denunciatory accusations, as is sometimes the case today. There were also some supporters, but then came the fall of the Wall and reunification, and the entire focus was turned to East Germany. Feeling that some of them were quite happy because they no longer had to deal with the subject.

Is demography also uninteresting for politicians because in a parliamentary democracy such as Germany's, people think too much in terms of legislatures, and the consequences of demographic developments will only be reflected in 80 or 90 years' time?

Politicians no longer listen when they are told that this or that development will take generations. Saxony was, as far as I know, the first federal state to set up an expert commission on „Demographic Change“ at government level. Its task was to „make Saxony fit for demographic change“. I was a member from the beginning. The prime minister found our findings plausible and correct, but do you know what he finally said? If I follow that, I won't win any more elections.

In the 1970s, the GDR began to introduce family policy measures. They worked for a few years, the birth rate went up, but then they went down again. Why was that?

In 1971, abortion was liberalised in both East and West in a remarkable way. Then came the pill. And nine months later, births collapsed in both countries. West Germany had immigration, which is why there was no talk about the demographic problem. Demographers were already half racist, so the view went. In the GDR, however, it was completely different. There, it was seen as a threat if the population disappeared: 'They no longer believe in socialism, so they won't have children.' The GDR reacted relatively wisely to this. In 1972, they founded a chair and an institute for demography. But they couldn't find out anything other than that it was a general trend that had only been accelerated by improved birth control. In the meantime, Erich Honecker was installed as first secretary of the Central Committee. He then introduced a kind of mass social policy, a housing construction programme, child premiums, etc. Before the GDR went bankrupt in 1986, it had spent 60 per cent of its gross national product on social policy. You can ruin a country economically in 15 years.

Prognosis for population development from 2004
© Institut for Applied Demography (I/F/A/D).

Small spatial population dynamics: The development occurred as prognosted
© Institut for Applied Demography (I/F/A/D).

But was the GDR regime successful on a demographic level?

That's interesting, and what I'm going to say can also be shown in other countries like Sweden: people think about whether they want one or two children, and whether the social program will stay in place permanently. If they want children, they simply prefer to have children. That happened massively in the 1970s. But by the end of the decade, we could already see declining figures. From 1979 onwards, the GDR stopped publishing the birth figures (TFR) because fertility started to decline again. Couples simply preferred to have children, but with the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification, that didn't matter. This has only accelerated an existing trend.

Although the social policy measures remained?

It's an old political wisdom: you can never take back social policy, never, except for one's own political downfall. So, as a citizen-benefit recipient, I would remain very optimistic. With births and social policy, it's like a tablecloth: if you push it together, I have a bump - the early children - and then there's no tablecloth on the other side, so there's a collapse in the birth rate. You could say that in the overall package, birth policy is actually counterproductive. In the 1990s, I was strongly attacked for this view. Since the women are all from childhood age, I can prove it.

Conservative parties in particular are campaigning for this, for example the AfD.

That is one of my main criticisms of the AfD programme. Like the other parties, they have an under-complex population policy. I wonder who wrote that. There is a lot to discuss about the AfD, but in terms of population policy, it is largely naive.

Refugee immigration scepticism: »Contrasts« (Kontraste, German Politics Magazine on TV) not published programme.

Let us move on to the subject of media and demography. If demographic decline affects all areas of society and is so threatening, then surely it should be a dominant theme in the media.

There are two developments. First of all, the media only have a limited amount of attention. Issues eventually run to death, as we have seen with the climate issue, and then there are these ripples. The demographic debate was very high on the agenda at one point, from about 2000 to 2010, and then it was replaced by the dominant immigration debate, which caused a great deal of damage because since then, there has been no realistical discussion of demography, because there was a universal argument: immigration solves all problems. The credo was that something positive always has to come out.

That sounds like right-wing populist talk.

Let me give you a wonderful example. In September 2015, a team from the public policy programme „Kontraste“ joined me for a day at the Institute. The journalists interviewed me, and I told them that I had a more nuanced view of immigration, and that there was no way to say that there were only positive aspects. Around 8 p.m., I got a phone call from the editor, whom I knew from other programmes. He almost cried when he had to tell me that he had been told from above that the recordings could not be brought, because only positive aspects of immigration could be reported. It's a story about a Syrian dentist who's been living in Berlin since the 1960s, as an example of successful integration. It was kind of like during the corona pandemic, when certain scientific opinions were simply not allowed to be published.

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Personal details Dr. Harald Michel

Dr. Harald Michel, born in Saxony in 1955, studied sociology at the Humboldt-University in Berlin. He completed his doctorate on the demographic history of Germany from 1816 to 1933. In 1992, he founded the »Institute for Applied Demography« (IFAD) and has been its director ever since. He has been a member of several expert commissions in various countries. Since 1993, he has held the lecture series „Economic and socio-historical aspects of demography“ (German title: 'Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der Demografie') at Humboldt University. Michel has published numerous books and specialist articles. His most recent publication is: „Demographic development and effects on spatial development - under the example of Brandenburg and the Uckermark region“, Academy for Spatial Development in the Leibniz Association (German title: 'Demographische Entwicklung und Auswirkungen auf die Raumentwicklung - Am Beispiel Brandenburg und der Uckermark', Akademie für Raumentwicklung in der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft), Hanover 2024. He is married and has two children.

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What did you do in that situation? Did you complain?

Since then, I've decided to only appear in certain media. For example, I'm regularly interviewed by media outlets in Hong Kong or South Korea..

You said that demographics are disappearing and coming in waves. On the bright side, it's time to address the issue again.

That will come again. It will burst out of every buttonhole, because it's not as if it will only affect the shortage of labour or skilled workers. We will notice it even more and above all in the social insurance systems in the coming years, especially in health insurance. Long-term care insurance is currently falling apart because there is a serious shift between those who are insured and those who pay in. The baby boomers are now retiring. But it's not even so much about pension payments as it is about the provision of medical care. That will break the system. We have known this for 30 years. The relationship between the generations has already changed dramatically and the dynamics will continue to increase. In Berlin, the number of people over 80 will double in the next five years. But do you see anywhere that retirement homes are being built here on a large scale? The government is blind in this respect, it can't and won't deal with it any more.

„If I don't have children, I don't have anyone to look after me.“

Will the family become more important again if the welfare state fails?

The problem is that a third of these senior citizens have no family. If I don't have children, I don't have anyone to look after me. In the big cities, the proportion of childless people is very high. There will be an emergency, but the government is thinking about cycle paths and gender-friendly toilets. This wrong prioritisation of problems in recent decades applies to every party in government so far.

The major media could write more positively about family.

They prefer to write about the changed family structures, which is completely exaggerated. You have to set the record straight: In the feature articles, it is often portrayed as if the traditional family is dissolving into a colourful arbitrariness. That's not true. All the figures we have show that there is a stable segment of around two thirds who want a traditional family. We refer to this as the average consumer. Incidentally, this is the milieu that sustains our society. It always has been. The other 20 to 30 per cent vary, but this group is not particularly dangerous for the resilience of society. Society thrives on the average consumer: Two-child family, pay off their own home, have an SUV in the garage, go on holiday to warm countries and listen to Helene Fischer. Incidentally, this segment also ensures demographic stability. There is an unbearable arrogance in the media that sometimes looks down on these people with such contempt. However, this is currently shaking itself up politically. These »normal people« are turning to parties that they see as representing their interests, not only in Germany but also in other Western countries.

„You have to bring about social change in people's minds, and that can't be done with money.“
© IMAGO / PhotoAlto

Where are the consequences of demographic change still visible?

In terms of spatial differentiation, for example. We will see extreme differences between urban and rural areas in the coming decades. Just like in the USA. If you are in Pennsylvania and drive to New York, for example, you will see stark differences.

Could it be that there will soon be depopulated regions in Germany?

Of course, and I am even in favour of not fighting this depopulation, as the current government is doing, but perhaps even supporting it. If I have the nearest doctor 80 kilometres away, that's no longer feasible for an elderly population.

And in the cities?

There will be a change there as a result of immigration, including an ethno-cultural change. Whether you think this is good or bad is another question. I can still remember debating this with colleagues when the population with a migration background was still five per cent. They were placated and said it had no consequences. But now we are talking about 60 per cent of minors in cities like Pforzheim or Offenbach having a migration background. That changes a society dramatically, of course, simply because of the numerical composition. You have to tell people that honestly. They weren't asked if they wanted this and they're not being given a clean bill of health. In my eyes, that is negligent. There will be bitter revenge for that.

„Change cannot be stopped or reversed in the short and medium term.“

According to official figures, 6.2 million unborn children have been aborted in Germany since the de facto liberalisation of abortion in 1976. If you add the expected children of these unborn children, then there are around ten million people missing in Germany today. Does abortion play a role in research?

No, that is not an issue. If it is, it plays a role in the political debate. In Germany, however, many people keep their hands off it because it is a taboo subject. But I warn against making this calculation. Because having children is one thing, but the other is how they grow up. It is important that children are lovingly cared for and grow up in a stable environment. Let me give you a dramatic example of what can happen when the government pursues an extremely restrictive abortion policy: Romania under Nicolae Ceaușescu. He had fallen out with Leonid Brezhnev and his 'brother nations' and wanted to build his own empire in competition with the Soviet Union and China. But he needed a large population for this. So he banned all birth control measures in the 1970s. Abortion was punishable by death for women. This was downright perverse at times: women in the socialist collectives, i.e. in the factories, had to keep public calendars to prove that they were not using birth control. They were pressurised into having children. As a result, there were thousands of children that mothers and fathers simply did not want. The children were abandoned or placed in orphanages.

That is an extreme example. Today, there are four to five adoptive parents for every child given up for adoption. This means that anyone who is unintentionally pregnant today and doesn't want the child at all can give it up for adoption, for example.

Yes, you can. But that can change again. Which brings us back to the question at the beginning. One scenario we discussed back in Washington was that there are certain women who are responsible for reproduction and others who work. In other words, a kind of division of labour. But ethically and morally I would have my doubts. I don't have a concrete answer to your question. My job is to point out the advantages and disadvantages. A ban on abortion would also have its downsides.

Finally, I would like to ask you to step out of your role as an observer. If the next German government were to approach you and you were head of an advisory committee on demographic change, what would you advise this government to do??

The same thing I have always done. Change cannot be stopped or reversed in the short and medium term. What a government can do, however, is to shape this change in a socially responsible way.

What does that mean?

I adapt my institutions to this change in the sense that situations do not arise that could dissolve democracy. Because that can happen. Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania is so sparsely populated that in some regions it is no longer possible to hold valid elections because an electoral board can no longer be formed. This means that anyone who wants to vote has to travel to another town. At the same time, the rule of law was temporarily suspended when an airport was used as a transshipment centre for drugs from Eastern Europe for a year. But nobody noticed because nobody lives there any more. Such developments paralyse a society and it has to adapt. Another important point is migration policy. Germany has tolerated migration for 50 years. We have zero influence on the composition of migrants and the legal manner in which they enter the country. We urgently need to start talking about migration policy. Policy means regulation, and that is not happening when it comes to migration.

These were more short-term measures. Think beyond the legislative period.

Unfortunately, this is a somewhat burnt term, but a clear policy of values should be re-established. Just as Helmut Kohl once envisaged, but never realised. However, society must first realise where it wants to go and what it wants from immigrants. In my opinion, this is not possible in Germany because the Germans themselves do not know who they are, what they want and where their place is. That hinders all other factors. As long as the Germans themselves don't know what they want as a society, we don't need to talk about anything else.

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